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Are acquisitions a poison pill
for innovation?
Michael A. Hitt, Texas A&M University
Robert E. Hoskisson, Texas A&M University
R. Duane Ireland, Baylor University
Jeffrey S. Harrison, Clemson University

Executive Overview The recent wave of acquisition activity may be damaging the innovative

capabilities of American firms, thus making them less competitive in the global
marketplace. In fact, acquisitions often serve as a substitute for innovation,
which may cause further neglect of internal research and development (R&D)
programs. Additionally. acquisitions often lead to increases in leverage,
diversification, and absorb significant amounts of executive time, which may
lead to reduced managerial commitment to innovation.
In this article, evidence is presented suggesting that acquisition activity may
result in reductions in R&D inputs and outputs. On average, the 191 firms in the
sample reduced their allocations to R&D relative to their competitors following
acquisitions. Furthermore, the firms also experienced reductions in the number
of patents.

Implications from this evidence are offered for executives and acquisition
strategies. Specifically, based on our results, we propose that firms can
compensate for the negative effects of acquisitions. Moreover, acquisitions,
when properly planned and targeted, may enhance or complement a firm's
innovation processes. Firms should search for acquisitions that complement R&D
projects, facilitate product commercialization and/or enhance their core
competences.

.............................................................................................................................................................................

Article The David Sarnoff Research Center produced many innovations for RCA. One of

the Center's widely recognized innovations, the electron gun, is used as a receiver
for the color system found in most televisions sets in the United States. In 1988, the
Center discharged 300 employees, reducing its staff by twenty-five percent. The
reduction occurred at the time GE transferred ownership of the Center to SRI
International, a nonprofit organization (GE acquired the Center as a part of its $6.4
billion acquisition of RCA). NBC, a division of RCA, had the largest market share
of viewers in 1986 when it was acquired by GE. NBC, however, failed to produce
any major hit shows in 1989 and 1990. As a result, its ratings were down twelve
percent and its operating profit fell twenty-seven percent in 1990 (and are expected
to fall a similar amount in 1991).
NBC's loss of market share and the virtual give away of the acclaimed Sarnoff
Research Center are symptomatic of deeper problems within GE. Michael Porter
of Harvard suggested that GE's strategy leads managers to focus on size rather
than building competitive advantage. Tom Peters argued that the strategy also
stifles creativity alnd noted that GE hasn't created a new business in decades.'1
Unfortunately, these symptoms are common in too many U.S. businesses. In fact,
a recent special report by Business Week stated,
"For nearly two decades the world's strongest economy has experienced a
market decline in its share of global output and an insidious decline in its living
22
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standard . . . It has been apparent, each time we return to the subject of
competitiveness, that much needs to be done. Yet, Americans have failed to act."2
Why have American firms lost much of the competitive advantage they once
enjoyed? The answer is not simple. However, one prominent reason may be the
lack of innovation relative to global competitors. International competition has
awakened us to the fact that the United States is losing its innovativeness.3
A recent study found

that almost one-third
of the acquired firms
are eventually
divested, suggesting
that a number of
acquisitions may not
perform well.

The solution to the U.S. competitiveness problem seems simple-innovate more.
The answer, however, is probably quite complex. For example, some have
argued that part of the problem stems from U.S. executives' fascination with and
emphasis on mergers and acquisitions. One fact is clear-U.S. firms have been
highly attracted to acquisitive growth in recent years. In fact, the number of
acquisitions has grown successively for the last three decades.
The evidence suggests that the value added by acquisitions is, at best,
controversial. Research shows that the target (or acquired) firm shareholders gain

value from the acquisition. In contrast, the value of acquisitions for acquiring firm
shareholders' varies closely around zero. It is not uncommon for acquired firms to
be divested in the years following an acquisition. A recent study found that almost
one-third of the acquired firms are eventually divested, suggesting that a number
of acquisitions may not perform well. Of course, there are many potential reasons.
For example, the original acquisition price paid may have been excessive. Also,
the newly acquired firm may be poorly integrated into the acquiring firm or
ineffectively managed after the acquisition.

One problem often cited in conjunction with ineffective management of acquired
firms is the unwillingness (inability) to invest adequate resources to continue
their growth and development. Dennis Maxwell, vice president of SRI
International, claimed that one result of the frenzied pace of acquisitions has
been less in-house R&D being conducted by acquiring companies. Kenneth
Flamm, an economist for the Brookings Institution, argued that acquisitions and
other types of restructuring have focused executives' attention on short-term
returns which contributed to a reduction of basic research.
In 1988, approximately 3 percent of R&D expenditures were allocated to basic
research, down from 5.4 percent in 1979. In fact, total R&D expenditures may also
be reduced. For example, in 1988, GE reduced total R&D expenditures by $300

million from 1987.

John Young, president of Hewlett Packard Co., suggested that reductions in R&D
are harming U.S. firms' competitiveness. He noted that R&D investment as a
percent of U.S. GNP is significantly below that in West Germany and Japan. He
also argued that U.S. firms must increase R&D investments to "play in this

league. "4

The reduction of investments in basic research and in total R&D outlays may lead
to fewer innovations. While this is a critically important issue, there has been little
definitive empirical research examining the effects of acquisitions on R&D
investments and outputs. Accordingly, we conducted a study to examine the
effects of acquisitions on R&D investments and outputs.

The Study

Our study examines the effects of acquisitions on R&D intensity (R&D divided by
firm sales) as a measure of R&D inputs and patent intensity (the number of patents
divided by firm sales) as a measure of R&D outputs. Data were collected on 191
23
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acquisitions completed between 1970 and 1986. Firms from twenty-nine separate
industries were included in our sample. We collected data on the acquiring and
target firms for three years prior to the merger and for three years after the year in
which the merger was completed (seven-year span).5 The influence of several
variables that may affect R&D intensity and patent intensity (e.g., average
industry R&D intensity, return on assets, diversification of the acquiring firm,
leverage, firm size, and liquidity) were controlled.
The Findings

After acquisitions, we found that R&D intensity increases slightly but not
significantly (that is, the change is not statistically significant). However, the slight
increases were due primarily to overall growth in R&D expenditures in the
acquiring and target firms' industries. The combined average R&D intensity of the
acquiring and target firms is close to the industry average three years prior to the
acquisition. However, the gap grows as the year of acquisition is approached and
continues to grow larger after the acquisition. The difference between firm and
industry R&D intensity is shown more clearly in Exhibit 1. As shown in this exhibit,
the difference increases between three years and one year prior to the acquisition
but then levels off. However, the gap increases in each of the second and third
years after the acquisition. Therefore, acquiring firms invest less in R&D than their
competitors and the gap widens after the acquisition is consummated.
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Some have discounted R&D spending as a robust measure of R&D effectiveness or
innovation. Stating this somewhat differently, resources can be wasted in R&D
labs, just as in other parts of the organization, and therefore, "more R&D is never

a substitute for better R&D." Larger firms (e.g., those created by mergers) enjoy
scale economies through which they can operate more efficiently (i.e., larger firms
have the ability to produce greater outputs with the same or fewer resources).6
Therefore, it is important to examine the outcomes from R&D before and after
acquisitions. Our measure of R&D outputs was patent intensity (number of patents
divided by total sales revenue).
Our findings are depicted in Exhibit 2. As shown, the combined number of patents
(relative to size of the firm) for the acquiring and target firms increases in two of
the three years before the acquisition. In fact, the average annual change in
patents is + 1.69 prior to the acquisition. However, there is a dramatic reduction in
patent intensity in the first year after the acquisition (leveling off for the next two
years). The average annual change in patents is - 1.88 after the acquisition. In
addition, we found the reductions in the number of patents to be particularly acute
in diversifying acquisitions (where target and acquiring firms are in industries
unrelated to each other). Clearly, these results do not support the notion that
acquisitions yield efficiencies in R&D.
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These findings also likely underestimate the effects of acquisitions because firm
size, diversification, leverage, liquidity, and profitability have also been argued to
affect investments in R&D.7 The amount of leverage (Exhibit 3) increased
dramatically the year of the acquisition and increased again in the second year
after the acquisition. In the third year after the acquisition, the amount of leverage
decreased to approximately pre-acquisition levels. Firms likely paid off the debt
from operating funds. Exhibit 4 shows dramatic effects of acquisitions on
profitability. Return on assets are significantly lower in the post-acquisition
compared to pre-acquisition period. Liquidity also declines significantly after
acquisitions.

Explanation for the Effects of Acquisitions on Innovation
Investments in R&D

At least three reasons may explain a potential negative effect of acquisitions on
R&D investment. First, managers may prefer to pursue acquisitions in lieu of
allocating what are typically significant amounts of resources that are required to
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products may be easier than with internally based product innovations. In fact, it
has been argued that acquisitions are a common means used to avoid risky R&D
expenditures and outcomes.9 Two examples are shown in the acquisitions of Kraft

and RJR Nabisco. Prior to the Philip Morris acquisition of Kraft, experts predicted
that it would mean more retreads of current products in multiple varieties (e.g.,
"new and improved" versions) based on actions following its General Foods
acquisition. Product line extensions are the least risky way for Philip Morris to
attempt to dominate shelf space in the retail food outlets. Executives at Philip
Morris apparently prefer to let other firms take the risk.

The fact that
acquisitions offer
immediate entrance to
a new market andlor
a larger share of a
market served
currently by the firm
may be attractive to
managers.

After RJR Nabisco's leveraged buyout by Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts, Nabisco

Brand's business grew by forty percent and RJR's operating income increased by
thirty-one percent. However, Nabisco also aggressively reduced costs by firing
high-paid research engineers and through cutbacks in marketing expenditures.
Therefore, profits were increased at the possible expense of future growth and
profits. 10

Decisions to emphasize acquisitions and/or deemphasize research may be subject
to increased managerial commitment. As managers complete acquisitions, their
commitment to this approach may increase over time. One factor that could
stimulate greater commitment is reduction in R&D competency resulting from
longitudinal decreases in the resource allocations to R&D. For example, the
donation of the Sarnoff Research Center to SRI by GE significantly reduced its
capability to produce innovations in television product lines.
A second possible explanation for a negative effect of acquisitions on investments
in R&D relates to the additional levels of debt that firms absorb to complete
acquisitions. Lack of internal capital or access to increased equity capital forces
firms to use additional debt. However, greater amounts of debt increase financial
risk. Managers are constrained by this risk to use cash flows to cover increased
interest expenses and to repay portions of the debt. These allocations of available
cash are necessary to maintain credit ratings and credibility with the capital
markets.
Also associated with additional debt are stricter operational constraints imposed
by creditors. These constraints result in more conservative managerial investment
strategies. Such conservative strategies may explain, at least in part, a reported
negative relationship between increased debt levels and R&D allocations.

A number of prominent finance scholars have argued that use of debt can and
should be quite positive. First, they suggest that debt serves as a disciplining
force on managers causing them to be more efficient. Second, debt costs transfer
funds from firms that are inefficient to bondholders who allocate them to other
firms that will use them more efficiently. Unfortunately, heavy debt costs often
force managers to substitute payments of these costs not from inefficient uses but
rather from investments that can be postponed without immediate negative
outcomes (e.g., R&D). Furthermore, managers requiring debt for discipline to
produce efficiency should be replaced by more effective managers.

Taken to an extreme, excess debt can destroy a company. For example, in 1985,
Fruehauf Corp. was the market leader in truck trailer manufacturing. However,
according to Joseph White, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, in 1989,
"Fruehauf once the General Motors of truck trailers is a jackknifed wreck." The
firm was losing $1 million per week and could not meet its $101 million per year
debt payments. As a result, the firm's assets were carved up and sold off. The
Southland Corporation faced a similar situation when it took on a huge debt load
28
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to finance an LBO to abort a takeover attempt. Eventually, to pay debt costs
Southland had to sell off assets from its highly profitable 7-11 division and accept a
majority partner from Japan. Additionally, Integrated Resources Inc. defaulted on
its debt of $2 billion in high yield junk bonds.11 The point is that debt has its risks.
Obviously, none of the executives in these three firms were concerned about
innovation; rather, they were concerned about their firm's survival.
A third reason that acquisitions may negatively affect R&D investments concerns
the substantial amounts of senior executives' time and energy required to first
negotiate and then complete acquisitions. Acquisitions often require extensive
preparations and sometimes laborious negotiations, particularly in unfriendly
acquisitions. Firms actively pursuing acquisitions conduct searches for viable
target firms. Typically, these searches are completed through sophisticated data
gathering techniques and analytical processes. The breadth and depth of the
reports and recommendations submitted to top level executives for their evaluation
and action typically absorb extensive amounts of managerial time.

Even friendly acquisitions require agreement among the parties on a range of
meticulous details. As a result, the identification, selection of, and negotiations
with potential acquisition targets require top executives to process significant
quantities of disparate information. Because of information overload, managers
may choose to delegate other critical decisions and operational matters.
Nonetheless, top level managers must still make major resource allocation
decisions. Managers' information constraints accentuate the riskiness of internal
development.

Ineffective

management and the
use of financially
based outcome
controls caused
managers to become
less interested in
developing and
championing new
products (because of
the risk and potential
return only in the long
term).

These problems are not limited to executives of the acquiring firm. Often, target
firm managers become absorbed in negotiating the deal or in fighting the
takeover attempt. Additionally, other managers in the target firm sometimes
operate as if in a state of suspended animation. They continue current operations
but without making long-term plans or investments (unless done to make the firm
unattractive as a takeover target). Takeover attempts often distract the attention of

target firm managers. For example, they may react as did RJR managers just prior
to the KKR financed leveraged buyout. An article in the Wall Street Journal
reported that many of the managers were angry and spent time swapping rumors
about the potential effects of an LBO. For example, many were fearful of losing
their jobs in cost reduction moves and as a result, were on the job market in

anticipation of potential cutbacks. 12 Thus, time and energy absorption, combined
with managerial risk aversion, may result in lower resource allocations to R&D.
In total, the evidence suggests that an emphasis on acquisitive growth may result
in risk-averse managerial mindsets. In turn, such mindsets may cause managers
to reduce their commitments to innovation. This commitment, defined as a
managerial willingness to allocate resources and champion activities that lead to
the development of new products, technologies, and processes consistent with
marketplace opportunities, may be critical to internal product development
activities.

Outcomes from R&D Investments
The relative degree of managerial commitment to innovation may be reflected by
the amount of resources invested in R&D and by the number of outputs (such as
patents) achieved through these investments. Because patents indicate an
intention to commercialize a product, they serve as a meaningful measure of R&D
outputs. Thus, regardless of the resources invested, the R&D process must be
managed effectively if desired successes are to be attained. In addition, ideas
must be appropriately championed if they are to be developed into patentable

products and/or processes. 13
Unfortunately, an acquisition may negatively affect a firm's championing culture.
For example, if top executives become less committed to innovation, they will offer
29
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fewer rewards and/or incentives to those desiring to create and champion
internally based product innovations. In turn, lower level managers become less
interested in expending efforts required for the development of product or process
ideas that lead to patents. As a result, the transfer of new product ideas to
marketable products is less likely to occur.
The problems of managing and commercializing product innovations are
exacerbated in diversifying acquisitions. In his latest book, Alfred Chandler, noted
business historian, argued that diversification into new product markets became
an accepted and preferred means of corporate growth in America. These firms
diversified early based on products from their own research laboratories.
However, as more firms invested in R&D, the development of innovative products
became more expensive and risky. As competition grew more intense, firms
began to invest in acquiring businesses unrelated to their current markets rather
than investing more in R&D and other developmental functions. As a result,
Chandler concluded that these firms lost their competitive advantage. Managers
were overseeing businesses they did not understand and thus could not manage
effectively. Because they lacked appropriate understanding of the businesses,
financial controls (focused on short-term oriented and risk-averse financial
outcomes) became the norm for management of diversified firms (as opposed to

longer-term strategic controls). 14 Ineffective management and the use of financially
based outcome controls caused managers to become less interested in developing
and championing new products (because of the risk and potential return only in
the long term). As a result, there was a reduction in commitment to innovation
and commercializing it. This may explain why we found lower patent intensity
after diversifying acquisitions.
.............................................................................................................................................................................

General Signal exemplifies the inability to manage diversification effectively. In
the 1980's, General Signal went on a diversification binge that included a foray
into glamorous but treacherous high technology industries (such as
semi-conductor equipment). The strategy produced a firm of forty-four
businesses, many of them unrelated to one another. Because of mountains of red
ink, a new CEO began selling off assets, more than $200 million to date. He also
attempted to sell the $130 million telecommunications business but
unfortunately, no buyers were found. To date, the divestments have yet to turn
around the firm's profits. Experts predict more sell-offs before the firm becomes
profitable and manageable.

More specific effects are shown in the Eastman Kodak Co. acquisition of Sterling
Drug Co. (for $5.1 billion). Kodak executives felt they could install "Kodak
management" and turn around the drug company's performance. In particular,
the "Kodak management" focused on Sterling's R&D operation. However,
Sterling's problems became more severe after Kodak's acquisition and installation
of its management team. Its new drugs have not been testing well while, at the
same time, its current product line faces fierce competition. Kodak managers
quietly cut projects that were predicted to generate new products for Sterling. As a
result, debt on the Sterling acquisition exceeded the firm's operating earnings by

$50 million in 1989. Critics ar?ued that Kodak paid too much for a business that it

had no expertise to manage. 5

In summary, based on the available evidence, we expected and found firms
following an acquisition strategy to invest less in R&D and to produce fewer
patents.

Conclusions and Implications
Some believe the raucous days of mergers and acquisitions are over, but the
demise of this popular strategy has been predicted previously. Nonetheless, the
30
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number of mergers and acquisitions has increased with each decade beginning
with the 1960s. With growing pressures for global competition, new financing
alternatives and pressures from Wall Street for improved performance, many
expect the popularity of the acquisitive growth strategy will continue unabated.'6

While acquisitions are expected to continue, the importance of innovation grows.
Lessons from history suggest the importance of being a first mover in the market.
This position is also supported by recent research examining fifteen different
global industries and found that sales growth was clearly linked with investments
in R&D. Regardless of the industry, the firms that invested more in R&D had
greater sales growth during the ten-year period of the study. 17 Innovativeness is
an important ingredient for global competitiveness.
The Singer Co.'s demise provides an example of the importance of innovation for
competitiveness. When Singer executives saw the U.S. sewing market begin to
shrink, instead of reinvesting profits in continued development of their sewing
products, they milked profits from this business to finance acquisitions. Eventually,
the sewing machine division was spun off to SSMC Inc. The 1600 company-owned
stores were closed (or sold), eliminating a dealer network built during four
decades. The poor quality of its new machines has severely hurt Singer's ability to

compete and harmed its reputation. 18
.............................................................................................................................................................................

We return to the primary question underlying this research and article, "Are
acquisitions a poison pill for innovation?" Results from our study suggest that
acquisitions may well lead to lower innovation. The results clearly show that in
addition to the effects of debt, diversification, size, profits, and liquidity,
investments in R&D (relative to competitors), and number of patents decrease
after acquisitions. Interestingly, the results also show that relative R&D and
patents are generally decreasing before the acquisitions and continue to
decrease thereafter. These results reinforce the concern that some of these firms
are using acquisitions as a substitute for innovation.

However, it is important to emphasize that not all acquisitions mean a poison pill
for innovation. In an earlier article, we argued that targeted and well-planned
acquisitions may well enhance firm innovation, growth, and overall value. Some
acquisitions may well be used to complement or enhance R&D and innovation.
For example, firms may acquire a company (often times smaller) with a
complementary patent, process, product market or other specialized skill/capability
not possessed by the acquiring firm and necessary to commercialize a product
idea produced by R&D. Thus, acquisitions may be necessary to commercialize
internal R&D projects. Therefore, an R&D project may be unsuccessful not
because of its lack of value, but because the innovation (or acquisition) is
mismanaged.

Firms may also acquire companies with new technology. This is particularly
effective when large firms with developed manufacturing and distribution systems
acquire smaller firms with developed innovative capacity. In this way, the core

competences of each firm complement the other (creating synergy). 19

Some acquisitions seek to capitalize on market power from combining two firms
R&D capabilities (e.g., in the highly competitive telecommunications or
pharmaceuticals industries). An example is the merger of Beecham and

Smithkline (now catlled Smithkline Beecham PLC). Combined, the firm is among
the top five global drug-makers, with Beecham strong in European markets and
Smithkline strong in the U.S. They cover more research areas, thereby increasing
the probability of discovering a blockbuster new drug.20
31
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Alfred Chandler noted that history has shown large-scale multinational
corporations to build competitive advantage by long-term investments in and
commitment to manufacturing, R&D, and marketing (distribution). As such, they
built and maintained capabilities to compete in their markets. Thus, acquisitions
should be aimed at enhancing or maintaining the firm's core competences (i.e.,
critical skills, capabilities, and knowledge). Likely these acquisitions will entail
businesses in related, as opposed to unrelated, product markets. ASK Computer
Systems' acquisition of Ingres Corporation, maker of database software, may
exemplify this case. The CEO of ASK, Sandra Kurtzig, has taken other bold moves
such as increasing funds for new products from ten to fifty percent of the R&D
budget. New products will be based on Ingres' database and will work on most
computers, broadening ASK's market.21

Our results suggest that unless acquisitions are well planned and targeted they
may injure a firm's innovation capabilities. Innovation seems critical for long-term
global competitiveness. Firms such as Nestle, Corning, and Warner Lambert have
been innovative and may be well positioned to solidify their position in global
markets in the 1990s and beyond. While Philip Morris has focused on product line
extensions in its General Foods and Kraft businesses, Nestle has been investing in
and developing innovations in nutrition, health foods, and elaborate freshly
prepared chilled entrees (refrigerated, not frozen). Warner-Lambert has invested
heavily in R&D and the investments are paying off with two new drugs, Cognex,
the first drug to treat Alzheimer's disease and Novon, a biodegradable substance
designed to replace disposable plastic products.

Our message to
executives is that you
can follow an
acquisition strategy
and be innovative,

but only with careful
planning and
execution.

Corning has built an excellent global network of interrelated businesses that share
technology and human resources. To do so, Jamie Houghton, the CEO, has
focused on quality, formed alliances (currently a partner in nineteen joint
ventures) primarily to enhance or complement technology or marketing
capabilities, and share technology across businesses (thereby leveraging
investments). 22

Our message to executives is that you can follow an acquisition strategy and be
innovative, but only with careful planning and execution. Based on the results of
our study, we offer the following guidelines for successful acquisitions and
innovations:

(1) Search for target firms that will complement R&D projects and/or enhance your
firm's core competences.

(2) Search for innovative target firms whereby the integration with your core
competences (e.g., manufacturing, marketing) creates synergy.
(3) Consider joint ventures as alternatives to acquisitions. In some cases joint
ventures can enhance/complement technology more than acquisitions.
(4) Share technological advances across businesses within your firm to leverage
investments.

(5) Avoid unrelated acquisitions unless there is a high probability of achieving
other than financial synergy (e.g., enhancing/complementing core
competences).

(6) Develop information systems that link R&D with key stakeholders (including
suppliers, customers, manufacturing, design, and marketing personnel) across

business units.

(7) Develop incentives that both foster R&D cooperation as well as encourage
product championing by key executives.

(8) Consider the long-term consequences of actions, prior to reducing investments
in R&D (relative to the industry) and/or lowering commitment to innovation in

other ways (e.g., reduction of the championing of innovations for

commercialization).
32
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The results of our study suggest some important implications for managers to
maintain the innovative output of their firms and their firms' ability to compete in
global markets. Our main theme is best summarized by the following quote:
"Mergers and acquisitions have become an almost routine fact of life in corporate
America. Preparation for mergers, however, is by no means routine. The quality
of the effort expended up front may determine the success of the resulting
merger. "23
...................

Endnotes

...........................
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